University of Baltimore Law Forum
Volume 30
Number 1 Summer/Fall 1999

Article 3

1999

A Court of Appeals of Maryland Time Capsule: Six
Historic Arguments in the Nation's Oldest
Appellate Court

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
(1999) "A Court of Appeals of Maryland Time Capsule: Six Historic Arguments in the Nation's Oldest Appellate Court," University of
Baltimore Law Forum: Vol. 30: No. 1, Article 3.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/lf/vol30/iss1/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Forum by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information,
please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.

Articles
A COURT OF ApPEALS OF MARYLAND TIME CAPSULE:

SIX HISTORIC

ARGUMENTS IN THE NATION'S OLDEST ApPELLATE COURT
INTRODUCTION
This article made its debut as a dramatic presentation
at the Maryland State Bar Conference in Ocean City,
Maryland on June 10, 1999. It presents a profile of six
constitutionally significant cases argued before the Court
of Appeals of Maryland. These cases, spanning a 150year period, combined great lawyers, great issues and
historic resonance.
State v. Buchanan was a sequel to McCullough v.
Maryland and the 19th Century predecessor to the more
recent savings and loan scandals. The case rewrote
Maryland conspiracy law and featured an appearance by
the U.S. Attorney General. It was also Luther Martin's
last big prosecution. Baltimore v. State involved the
State's takeover ofthe Baltimore City Police Department.
It caused as much controversy as the State's takeover of
the Baltimore City School Board in 1997. The early
property rights case, Weyler v. Gibson, anticipates modem
takings, and constitutional torts litigation. University v.
Murray laid the groundwork for the later Supreme Court
decision in Brown v. Board o/Education. The court's
decision in Schowgurow v. State had a devastating impact
on the criminal justice system. The decision ultimately
resulted in hundreds of retrials and two Supreme Court
decisions on double jeopardy. Finally, Stuart v. Board
o/Supervisors, reminds us that it was not so long ago
that a married woman was recognized legally only by the
name of her husband.
The arguments below were developed and drafted
based on a number of historical resources including
appellate briefs, the case as reported in the Maryland
Reporter, and other historical and biographical infonnation
provided by the Maryland Archives and the Administrative
Office ofthe Courts. The authors ofthe arguments include
the Honorable Glenn Harrell, Court of Appeals of
Maryland, and attorneys Dwight Sullivan, Michael P. Smith,
and Robert Zamoch. The dramatic presentation was
performed by the Honorable Diana G. Motz, United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, the Honorable

Alan Wilner, Court ofAppeals ofMaryland, the Honorable
Glenn Harrell, Court of Appeals of Maryland, the
Honorable Arrie Davis, Court of Special Appeals of
Maryland, and attorneys Kevin Arthur, Michael P. Smith,
Ralph Tyler, and Robert Zarnoch.

••••••••••••••••••••••••
Narrator: The Court of Appeals of Maryland is
probably the oldest appellate court in the United States. I
Although created by the State Constitution of 1776, its
origin goes back more than a half century before, when
the Governor and his Council exercised an appellate
jurisdiction roughly equivalent to that ofthe House of
Lords. 2
Despite its ancient lineage, the court has not yet
entered middle age. Its arteries are sound. It's gait is
sprightly and its heart and pulse beat strongly as it marches
toward the millennium. Today, we will look at a small
cross-section ofthe court's history - six cases spanning
150 years. We do not claim that these are the six greatest
cases in the court's history. It might be impossible to
assemble such a list. The greatest cases could still be
waiting to be argued. But these six cases do have one
thing in common; they resonate withhistory-Iegal history,
Maryland history - the history ofexcellent lawyering in
the State. And we hope you will agree that they ring with
modem truths.

••••••••••••••••••••••••
Journey back to the early part of the 19th Century
- 1821 to be exact. The court is presently composed of
six appointed judges who were also trial judges. 3 It has

I See Proceedings of The Court of Appeals of Mary land, at the opening
ofthe Court, statements of Judge Wilson K. Bames, Oct. 10, 1972,266
Md. at xxiii [hereinafter Opening of the Court].

2See id.
3 See Carroll T. Bond,Anlntroductory Description ofthe Court ofAppeals
ofMaryland, 4 MD. L. REv. 333, 334 (1940) [hereinafter Description of
the Court ofAppeals].
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been located in a room in the State House for some 40
years, although the court also sits on the Eastern Shore. 4
We believe the judges wore robes, but they probablY did
not have an elevated bench. The room looks very much
like a trial courtroom. There was no limit on the length of
oral argument. S It would not be until 1826, that the court
would fix a six-hour limit on arguments on the Western
Shore.6 Arguments by members - ofwhat was probably
a genuine appellate bar--could run for days and were
marked by dramatic performance, flights of eloquence,
learned allusions and, given their length, a great deal of
tedium.

••••••••••••••••••••••••
Our first argument combines two well-known
components ofMaryland legal history - banking scandals,
like those experienced in the State in the 1960' s and
1980' s, and Luther Martin - venerable Attorney General,
distinguished delegate to the Constitutional Convention,
''the bulldog offederalism," "Lawyer Brandy Bottle," and
early-American super-lawyer. 7
Toward the end of his long career, Martin, much
like Ahab and the whale, became obsessed with the evils
of the National Bank. He argued in the Supreme Court
and lost McCulloch v. Maryland, 8 which held that the
State could not tax a branch of the United States Bank.
Undeterred, in State v. Buchanan,9 Martin continued his
assault. However, his was not a frivolous obsession. When
Bank officers, James Buchanan, George Williams and
James McCulloch wanted money from the bank, they
simply took it without giving security or bothering to infonn

the Bank's directors. 10 Martin sought to indict themcharging a conspiracy to defraud and impoverish the
Bank. I I While making the criminal presentments, Martin
suffered a disabling stroke. 12 The case moved forward,
but upon a demurrer of the defendants, two judges ofthe
County Court of Harford County (over a dissent)
dismissed the case, apparently concluding that the
indictment charged no crime and that the State court had
no jurisdiction. 13 The State appealed.
Despite the confusion of the official reports, in the
court ofappeals the defendants were represented by Daniel
Raymond and William Pickney.14 The State was
represented primarily by Henry M. Murray and Robert
Goodloe Harper. IS Also involved in the case was United
States Attorney General William Wirt, who was specially
admitted after taking the required oath declaring his "belief
in the Christian religion." I 6 We will hear from Murray and
Raymond.

•••••••••••••••••••••••••
THE STATE v. BUCHANAJV17
Henry M. Murray for Appellant: The first count
of the indictment charges the Defendants, Mr. Williams,
Mr. Buchanan and Mr. McCulloh with an executed
conspiracy-falsely, fraudulently, and unlawfully, by
wrongful and indirect means, to cheat, defraud and
impoverish the President, Directors and the Company of
the Bank ofthe United States.
These three men conspired together to obtain and
embezzle a large amount of money and promissory notes

III

See Buchanan, 5 H. & J. at 319-322.

II

See id. at 323.

12

See Maryland and the Constitution, supra note 7, at 320.

13

See Buchanan, 5 H. & J. at 324.

14

See id. at 328.

15

See id. at 324.

4See id.
See CARROLL T. BOND, THE COURT OF ApPEALS OF MARYLAND, A HISTORY
81 (1928) [hereinafter A HISTORY]'

5

6

See id. at 137.

William L. Reynolds II, Luther Martin, Maryland and the Constitution,
47 MD. L. REV 291, 321 (1987) [hereinafter Maryland and the
Constitution].

7

B

17 U.S. (44 Wheat) 316 (1819).

16

See id.

9

5 H. & J. 317 (1821).

17

5 H. & 1. 317 (1821).
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for the payment of money, commonly called bank notes,
the entire swn having a value ofFifteen Hundred Thousand
Dollars in United States currency. This money was the
property ofthe President, Directors, and Company ofthe
Bank of the United States. It came out of the office of
discount and deposit ofthe Bank in the City ofBaltimore,
the very office where Buchanan was president and
McCulloh was the cashier, without the knowledge or
consent ofthe President, Directors, or Company of the
Bank ofthe United States.
The purpose ofthe conspiracy was to have and enjoy
the money of the Bank for a long space of time - two
months - without paying any interest or other sum and
without securing the repaying ofthe money. In furtherance
of this scheme, James W. McCulloh, the cashier of the
office of discount and deposit, would falsely and
fraudulently state and represent to the directors ofthe office
of discount and deposit that the monies and promissory
notes that were loaned had sufficient and ample security
- the capital stock ofthe Bank. Williams, Buchanan and
McCulloh carried out the scheme in abuse and violation
oftheir duty and in violation ofthe trust reposited in them
as officer of the Bank.
It is not open to question that the matters charged in
the indictment amount to an offense that could be
prosecuted as crime. Conspiracy is a crime and an offense
at common law. The gravamen ofthe offense consists of
the unlawful combination or confederacy to injure a third
person. The State does not have to show actual execution
ofthat unlawful or wrongful purpose. This was clearly the
law ofEngland. But when our ancestors came to this land
and they settled the colony of Maryland they brought the
common law ofEngland with them as part oftheir birthright
The law of conspiracy was part ofthat law and it remains
in full force here today as it was in England then. So the
act of criminal conspiracy should be recognized by the
courts ofthis State as it has already been recognized by
other states in the United States.
Now the Defendants argue that Maryland courts
cannot hear the case because the charges refer to the Bank
ofthe United States. Nothing in Art. III section 2 of the
Constitution requires the case to be filed in a United States
court. The Ninth Amendment states that "[t]he
enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not
be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the

People." The Tenth Amendment states that "[t]he powers
not delegated to the United States by the Constitution,
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States." So therefore, the State of Maryland has retained
the power to have these charges heard in its courts.
Daniel Raymond for Appellees: Your honors,
the indictment below was properly dismissed. The statute
33 Edward §1 is the origin of the Law of Conspiracy.
This statute does not include conspiracies to cheat.
Cheating itself, with one or two exceptions like
cheating with false weights, false measures or false dice, is
not an offense that is punishable at common law. It would
therefore be an absurdity to punish an agreement to cheat,
when cheating itself is not punishable by the State.
Now the State has cited many, many cases either in
argument or in submissions to you. Almost all of those
cases are conspiracies to do acts which are themselves
indictable. They have no application here. I am sure that
in those many, many cases you might find a few of a
different character, that are from doubtful authority, from
which one might weave together a principle oflaw that is
just absurd on its face - that you can be indicted for
conspiracy to do something that in and of itselfyou cannot
be indicted for. Those questionable cases do not justify a
reversal here.
The State also contends that our ancestors brought
with them the common law of England, and that that law
as it sees it must be taken as established at the time of
their emigration. Even if that is so, the common law in
England at the time was that a conspiracy is not a crime
unless it is to do some act which is itselfindictable.
In addition, the indictments were properly dismissed
because even if a naked agreement to cheat is indictable
in this State, it must still be an agreement to cheat some
person or being known to the laws ofthe state ofMaryland.
The Bank of the United States was created by a
government foreign to Maryland. The Bank was created
under the laws of the United States. An agreement to
cheat the Bank ofthe United States is no more an offense
against the laws ofMaryland, than an agreement to cheat
the Bank of England would be. So if this Court decides
that the matters charged in the indictments are offenses
punishable as a crime, the courts ofthis State still have no
jurisdiction over the case. Such a crime being perpetrated
30.1 U. Bait. L.F. 15

Articles
against an entity created by the United States is only
cognizable in the Courts ofthe United States under Article
III, Sections 1 and 2 of the Constitution.

•••••••••••••••••••••••••
Narrator: In 1821, the court reversed the dismissal
ofthe indictment. 18 Judge John Buchanan (no relation to
the Bank officer), in a lengthy opinion, noted that Maryland
had inherited the English common law on conspiracy and
that the offenses were indictable even ifnothing had been
done in execution ofthe conspiracy}9 The court also held
that the matters charged were not a crime against the United
States, but a common law offense against the State of
Maryland.20 Finally, Judge Buchanan said:
It may be admitted, that the legislature ofthe

state has no right to pass laws calculated to
control or impede the operations of the bank.
But it is difficult to imagine, how a general
power in the judicial tribunals of the state, to
punish an offence against the State, can be
considered as an unconstitutional interference
with the concerns of the Bank of the United
States, or in any manner endangering its
security, only because its officers happened to
be the objects of the prosecution ....21
Despite the State's victory in the court of appeals,
the scoundrels eventually prevailed. 22 Buchanan and
McCulloch were later tried in Harford County and
acquitted by the same 2-1 vote that marked the initial
decision?3 Subsequently, Williams was acquitted, because

II

See id. at 368.

19

See id. at 352.

211

See id. at 361.

21

See id. at 362.

by himself he no longer could be found guilty of a
conspiracy.24
Martin never recovered from his stroke.2s He moved
to New York to be cared for by one of his former clients
-AaronBurr. 26 Martin died in 1826.27

••••••••••••••••••••••••
In 1860 the court still occupied its traditional quarters
in the State House, but a great deal had changed. As a
result of the Reform Constitution ofl851 ,judges (who
were now called "justices") were elected. 28 To protest
the change, the entire membership ofthe court declined to
run for election. 29 In addition, the court of appeals now
consisted of only four judges. 30 Bowing in 1828 to
Jacksonian democracy, judges no longer wore distinctive
dress,31 and the Constitution now required written
opinions.32

• ••••••••••••••••••••••••
Bigger changes were taking place in the State.
Recurrent election day violence in Baltimore City by
members of the Know Nothing Party had won for the
City the unenviable title of "Mobtown."33 Roving gangs
with blood-curdling names such as the "Rip Raps," the
"Plug Uglies," and the "Blood Tubs" "cooped up" drunks
and led them to cast multiple votes for their own party,
while intimidating the opposition from voting with bullets,

24

See id.

2' See Maryland and the Constitution. supra note 7, at 320.
26

See id. at 321.

27

See id.

21

See Description ofthe Court ofAppeals, supra note 3 at 334.

29 See

n David S. Bogen, The Scandal of Smith and Buchanan, 9 MD. LAW
FORUM 125, 131 (1985) (citing R. Harper, A Report ofthe Conspiracy
Cases, 3 (1823».

311

See Description ofthe Court ofAppeals, supra note 3 at 334.

31

See Opening of the Court, supra note I, at xxiv.

32

See Description ofthe Court ofAppeals. supra note 3 at 340.

See THE BALTIMORE BOOK, NEW VIEWS OF LOCAL HISTORY 3 (Elizabeth
Fee, et aI., eds., Temple Univ. Press 1991).

33
23

See id.
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brawn and mayhem - oftentimes with the assistance or
sufferance ofCity Police officers. 34
In 1860 legislation came before the General
Assembly to curtail such acts oflawlessness by creating a
four-member Police Board of Baltimore City.35 Unable
to kill the bill on the merits, the Know Nothings piled on
obnoxious amendments such as one banning "Black
Republicans" or "endorsers or supporters ofthe Helper
Book, "an anti-slavery tract, from serving on the new
Board. 36 Nevertheless, the bill was enacted and was
immediately challenged by the City, which contended that
its charter was a constitutional one that could not be
diminished by the transfer of control of the City Police;
that only the Governor, not the General Assembly, could
control appointments to the Board; and that the "Black
Republican" disqualification was unconstitutional and not
severable from the remainder of the Act. 37 Following a
loss in the Superior Court, the City appealed. 38 Within
weeks the case was before the court of appeals. Arguing
for the City was Thomas Alexander.39 Among those
arguing for affirmance was legal legend Reverdy
Johnson.40

•••••••••••••••••••••••••
BALTIMORE CITYv. STATEH
Thomas S. Alexander for Appellants: In the late
session, the General Assembly ofthis State passed an Act
for the purpose of repealing the powers ofthe Mayor and
City Council ofBaltimore to establish and regulate a police

34 See

H.H. Walker Lewis, The Baltimore Police Case of1860,26 MD. L.

REv. 215,218-19(1966).

3' See art. 4, 1860 Md. Laws 312.
36

See id. at 315.

37

See Baltimore Cilyv. State, 15 Md. 376,407-424 (1860).

38

See id at 380-401.

39

See id at 407.

4n

See id at 411.

41

15 Md. 376 (1860).

force, and in place of that power providing a permanent
police for the City of Baltimore. The chartered rights of a
large, prosperous city have been invaded by a legislative
enactment which has no warrant in the Constitution.
The Constitution does not confer upon the legislature
the power to appoint members of the Police Board.
Appointment to office is peculiarly an executive, not
legislative, power. Section 11 of Article 2 of the
Constitution gives the legislature, in creating an office,
power only to proscribe the mode ofappointment. This
can, by no legitimate manner ofconstruction, be interpreted
to grant the power of legislative appointment.
The Act transfers the whole existing police force of
the City ofBaltimore - officers and men - from the city
governmentto the Commissioners. That is unconstitutional
and illegal. The charter of 1796, in giving to Baltimore a
local government, by unavoidable implication gave all the
means necessary for the purpose of government, among
which was a police power to maintain the peace and
security ofthe governed. This is an inherent right, coexistent with the government, and cannot be separated
from it. Ifthe legislature has no power to repeal the charter
of 1796, it also has no power to dismember the
government created by it, by annulling and destroying
important and indispensable powers.
It is further provided by section 6 of the Act, "that
no Black Republican ... shall be appointed to any office
under said Board." The prohibition ofthe Black Republican
introduces into our legislation the broad principle of
proscription for the sake ofpolitical opinion The invaluable
birthright of every freeman is that he may express at
pleasure his opinions on all subjects of public policy,
restrained only by positive enactment to the contrary.
If a legislature in former days had proscribed the
Roman Catholic or the naturalized citizen, it is presumed
this Court would have no difficulty in pronouncing against
the constitutionality of the provision. In principle, the
proscription is the same. In degree the difference is that
whilst the test of religion or of birth is susceptible of
evidence, the test created by the Police Bill rests in the
pleasure of the Police Board. What is Black
Republicanism? A Black Republican may be defined to
be one who thinks the area of slavery ought not to be
enlarged. Again, he may be defined to be one who thinks
Congress has power to legislate over the subject of slavery
30.1 U. Bait. L.F. 17
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in the territories. It is certain that in the letter of the
proscription there is an elasticity which will, with willing
minds, justify its expansion over two-thirds of the
population ofBaltimore. Ifthis disqualifying clause is an
operative part of the Act, the whole Act must be
pronounced unconstitutional.
Reverdy Johnson for Appellees: The questions
regarding the judgment ofthe court below fall under two
heads: the first relating to the authority ofthe legislature to
create a Board of Police and to appoint its members; and
the second relating to the powers conferred on the Board.
As to the ability ofthe General Assembly to create
and fill an office, it is sufficient to refer to Article 2, Section
11 of the Constitution which provides that the governor
shall nominate and, by and with the advice and consent of
the Senate appoint, all civil and military officers ofthe State
whose appointment or election is not otherwise provided
for "unless a different mode of appointment be
prescribed by the law creating the office. " The power
of appointment to office is not, under our form of
government, a purely and inherently executive function.
The City of Baltimore maintains that because the
Constitution recognizes the city as part and parcel of the
organized government ofthe State, its charter is therefore
placed beyond the power of the legislature to modify or
change it. Yet it will hardly be pretended that it is beyond
the power ofthe legislature to enlarge the limits ofthe city,
by bringing portions ofthe county within its borders, or to
confer upon the city authorities the discharge ofother duties
than those they now possess. Such has never been the
construction of the Constitution. The charter ofthe city,
from the day of its passage to the present, has constantly
been subject to alteration and amendment by the
legislature, and the inconveniences which would result from
now placing it beyond the power of such alteration and
amendment are so obvious that they need not be pressed.
Nothing but plain and explicit language in the Constitution
could effect such a result. Such language cannot be found
in that instrument. It is clear that the people when they
adopted the Constitution never supposed they were parting
with the power to govern and control the City ofBaltimore,
and to pass such laws as they might deem the public good
required to meet the constantly changing and increasing
necessities ofits population.
30.1 U. Bait L.F. 18

An objection is raised to the proviso that "no Black
Republican, or endorser or supporter ofthe Helper Book,
shall be appointed to any office under said Board." It is
said that this proviso proscribes persons for the sake of
their political opinions. But, if such proscription was
designed, it is totally at variance with the other provision
of the law which requires the Commissioners to take an
oath that they will not appoint any person to, or remove
any person from any office under "on account of his
political opinion." It is a provision inteIjected into the Act
repugnant to its whole scope and object, and if it imposes
a disqualification for office not sanctioned by the
Constitution, it will be stricken from the law without
impairing the efficiency ofthe other parts ofthe law.

•••••••••••••••••••••••••
Narrator: As quickly as the case arrived in the court
of appeals, it concluded. The justices had little trouble
upholding the law, reasoning that the City was a creature
ofthe State and that the Governor had no exclusive power
to appoint that was infringed by the Police Reform Act. 42
As to the "Black Republican" qualification for office, the
Court's opinion stated that "we cannot understand,
officially, who are meant to be affected by the provis[ion],
and, therefore cannot express ajudicial opinion on the
question. "43 Thus, this particular confrontation between
City and State ended and order was restored on City
election days. Of course, as a result of a series oflater
General Assembly enactments, the City regained control
over its police force. 44 However to this day, the City Police
is by law a "state" agency. 45 It would not be the last time
that the General Assembly would transfer a major function
from the City to the State. With varying degrees of City
consent, in the 1990's the jail and the local board of
education were made subject to State control.

42

See id. at 459-61.

43

See id. at 468.

44

See Md. Ann Code art. 24, § 16-101 (1957, Rep\. Vol 1998).

4S

See id.
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•••••••••••••••••••••••••
It is nearly 50 years later. The court survived the

Civil War and two more Constitutional Conventions. But
a great deal had changed. There was no longer a special
appellate bar and lawyers no longer wore long black coats
and high silk hats. 46 More elaborate briefs were required.
Arguments were shorter and no longer sprinkled with
classical allusions. 47 "Justices" became "judges" again.
By 1914 the judges would return to black silken ,gowns
as the ceremonial dress. 48 Most importantly, in 1903, after
122 years, the eight judges of the court moved out of the
State House into a new courtroom on State Circle.49 One
reason for the move, the need to house an expanding State
law library, suggested the increasing complexity ofthe 20th
century legal scene.

••••••••••••••••••••••••••
Our next case appears to be a small one. The
Plaintiffs recovered a one-cent judgment against the
State. 50 Naturally, the Government appealed. However,
appearances are deceiving and the eventual influence of
the decision is immense. Ironically, it involved a dispute
over a portion of"Great Constitution" Street in Baltimore
City.51 The roadbed was owned by the Gibsons and on
this property the State, without their consent, built an
extension of the Maryland Penitentiary. 52 The Gibsons
sued John Weyler, the warden of the institution in
ejectmerit. S3 Weyler, the user, not the taker ofthe property

46

See A HISTORY, supra note 5, at 188-89.

47

See id. at 188.

4R

See Opening of the Court, supra note I, at xxiv.

See Opening of the Court, statements of Chief Judge Robert C.
Murphy, supra note I, at xxii.

49

raised the defense of sovereign immunity. 54 Judge Alfred
Niles rejected the defense and ordered judgment for the
Plaintiffs, including a nominal damage award. 55 On appeal,
Weyler was represented by Attorney General Issac Lobe
Strauss and the Gibsons by Frederick Fletcher. s6

••••••••••••••••••••••••
WEYLER v. GIBSON7
Attorney General Issac Lobe Strauss for
Appellant: The State of Maryland may not be sued in
this matter directly, nor indirectly through the warden of
its penitentiary. The State, without its assent, cannot be
impeded and ousted by its own courts from the possession
and management of its institutions and property while
discharging its public duties owed to the people composing
our State. This is a firmly settled principle oflaw and
public policy, supported by a legion of case authorities.
I would note further to this honorable court that
Warden Weyler, for the purposes ofan action in ejectment,
is not the true tenant in possession, nor is he a true party
claiming adversely to the appellees' interests. The warden
is but a mere servant at will of the directors of the
penitentiary. The directors, were they a named defendant
here, could assert the immunity ofthe State, as well as the
equitable defense that the appellees should not be heard
in ej ectment now when they stood by silently, resting on
their rights, while the State expended public monies to
erect the enlarged prison across Great Constitution Street.
The warden, however, as a mere functionary, cannot
personally assert such defenses. Appellees should not be
permitted to maneuver this suit to choose an opponent
whose choice ofweapons with which to defend himself is
so limited.
Finally, as the public closure of Great Constitution
Street has not been consummated in a complete legal sense
by the Baltimore City authorities, appellees are not entitled
to maintain an action in ejectment for land that legally

leI

See Weyler v. Gibson, 110 Md. 636,651,73 A. 261 (1909).

54

See id. at 650-51, 73 A. at 261.

51

See id. at 648, 73 A. at 261.

55

See id. at 648, 73 A. at 261.

52

See id. at 648-49,73 A. at 261.

56

See id. at 637,73 A. at 261.

53

See id. at 650, 73 A. at 262.

57

110 Md. 636, 73 A. 261 (1909).
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remains impressed with a public easement as a street. If
appellees have any right to sue, it is to sue the City and its
commissioners for opening (and apparently closing) streets,
for completion of the abandonment process and for a
determination as to whether the value of their property
interest is greater or lesser for having the street closed and
whether the value of any public benefit accruing from
closure would result in an assessment against appellees.

State action - whether in the shape of
constitutions, statutes, orjudicialjudgmentsthat deprived any person, white or black, natural
or corporate, of life, liberty, or property, or of
the equal protection ofthe laws. Its value consists
in the great fundamental principles ofright and
justice which it embodies and makes part ofthe
organic law ofthe nation."

Frederick H. Fletcher for Appellees: It cannot
be, indeed it has not been, disputed that my clients, the
heirs ofthe late Governor Carroll and his wife, are lawfully
the owners ofthe fee ofthe roadbed of Great Constitution
Street. Likewise, it is patent that the State, without my
clients' permission and without compensation being paid
to them, has taken upon itselfto appropriate that land for
use as part of the Maryland Penitentiary, thereby also
denying to the public the former use of the land for its
dedicated public easement as a road. Further, the State
concedes, as it must, that its efforts to close Great
Constitution Street legally were incomplete and imperfect.
My clients have every right to maintain this suit in
ejectment. It may be argued that we are arrogant to ask
any court to order the State to move or remove a structure,
built with considerable public tax revenues, that is fiftyfive feet tall with walls three feet thick. That, however, is
notnecessarilyourobjective. We ask rather that the wrong
committed against my clients be remedied as the court
sees fit.
Our Declaration of Rights declares that every man
for any injury done to him in his person or his property
ought to have remedy by the course ofthe law of the land,
and that no man ought to be deprived of his property, but
by the judgment of his peers, or by the law ofthe land,
and section 40, Article 3 ofthe Constitution prohibits the
passing ofany law authorizing private property to be taken
for public use, without just compensation as agreed
between the parties, or awarded by a jury, being first paid
or tendered to the party entitled to such compensation.
Nor shall any State deprive any person of his property
without due process of law. Speaking of the 14th
Amendment ofthe Constitution, Judge Dillon says:

If these rights are to have any meaning, the State cannot
evade its obligations here.

••••••••••••••••••••••••
Narrator: The court of appeals affirmed Judge
Niles, resting its decision on constitutional grounds. 58 The
judges said that:

[I]t would be strange indeed, in the face ofthe
solemn constitutional guarantees, which place
private property among the fundamental and
indestructible rights of the citizen, if [the]
principle of [sovereign immunity] could be
extended and applied so as to preclude him
from prosecuting an action ofejectment against
a State Official unjustly and wrongfully
WI·thh0 ld·mg property .... 59
The judges in essence told the State to settle the case or
condemn the Gibson property. So presumably, they
received a little more than a penny.
Although rarely cited for 80 years, in the 1980' sand
1990' s Weyler v. Gibson became the cornerstone of the
court's unique constitutional torts jurisprudence.60 As a
result ofWeyler, State and local officials have no immunity
from a state constitutional claim such as taking ofproperty
or deprivation of due process. It is hard to imagine a
greater deterrent to arbitrary and unconstitutional State
conduct.
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•••••••••••••••••••••••••
A major event in the history ofthe Court ofAppeals
also happened to be a major event in the history of the
civil rights movement and a major event in the life of
Thurgood Marshall. It began in 1930 when Marshall was
denied admission to the University of Maryland Law
School solely because of his race. 61 Instead of being
allowed to attend a school in his home state that was a
10-minute trolley ride from his home, for three years
Marshall had a grueling commute to Howard University in
Washington, D.C. 62 At Howard, Marshall graduated first
in his clasS.63 After he passed the Maryland bar, he entered
private practice.64 Soon, however, his major occupation
was helping to rebuild the Baltimore branch of the
NAACp6s and planning litigation to open doors for African
Americans, particularly at post-graduate institutions such
as the University of Maryland Law School. 66
Marshall helped choose an ideal plaintiff to attack
the segregationist policies of the law school- Donald
Gaines Murray, a 20-year old Amherst graduate.67 Murray
wrote once to the University and received back a form
letter advising him ofthe school's separatist policies, but
ofthe possibility ofa scholarship at an out ofstate school.68
He applied once, then twice to Maryland, but was denied
admission on both occasions. 69 The last letter notified
Murray of the "exceptional facilities open to you for the

MICHAEL D. DAVIS & HUNTER R. CLARK, THURGOOD MARSHALL: WARRIOR
AT THE BAR, REBEL ON THE BENCH 47 (1992) [hereinafter THURGOOD
MARSHALL)'
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See id. at 47-48.
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See id. at 61.
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See id. at 69.

study oflaw" at Howard University.70 Soon thereafter,
Marshall filed a mandamus action against the University
of Maryland, seeking Murray's admission. 71 Using the
"Separate but Equal" doctrine as a sword, Marshall
charged that the University's policies denied equal
protection because there was no state law school for
African American students.72 Although there had never
been a court-ordered desegregation of a public school,
Marshall convinced Baltimore City Judge Eugene O'Dunne
that the University's exclusionary policy was
unconstitutional and that a mandamus should issue.73 An
appeal followed to the court of appeals. Arguing for the
State was Assistant Attorney General Charles LeViness;
for Murray, Thurgood Marshall. 74

•••••••••••••••••••••••••
UNIVERSITY v. MURRA.f1 s

Charles Le Viness for Appellant: While
preserving Maryland's traditional policy of separation of
the races, the State has met the demand ofthe negroes for
higher education by establishing a system of scholarships
to institutions out of the State for the exclusive use and
benefit of colored students. This scholarship policy was
launched by the Legislature of 1933, which provided that
the Board ofRegents ofthe University ofMaryland might
set apart a portion of the State appropriation for Princess
Anne Academy and establish scholarships for negro
students who might wish to take professional courses or
other work not offered in Princess Anne but which were
offered white students at the University of Maryland.
To its negro citizens who desire to take up law work,
Maryland says substantially this: "under our policy of
separate schools for both races it is permissible and proper
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for the University of Maryland Law School to deny your
admittance. Ifyou were admitted, you would have to pay
the tuition fee of$203 a year. We cannot yet give you a
separate law school in the State: there is no sufficient
demand for it, nor sufficient money available to start it.
However, to even things up, we will pay your tuition at
some law school of your own selection out of the State.
You will save the $203 tuition fee at Maryland and you
may apply this money to your maintenance at the law school
ofyour choice."
The classification of students is a matter of internal
State policy. Ifit were unconstitutional to classify on the
basis ofrace, it also would be improper to classify on the
basis ofstudies, or on the basis of sex. Certainly, it cannot
be contended that if a state provided a law school for its
citizens it also must provide a medical school, or an
engineering school. The University ofMaryland includes
among its Baltimore schools a law school and a medical
school. It does not include an engineering school. Yet,
this is a discrimination in favor of those desiring to study
law or medicine and against those desiring to study
engineering. Similarly, a state might provide, without
encountering constitutional objections, a certain school for
men without a corresponding school for women.
Distinctions on the basis ofsex uniformly have been upheld
by the courts.
In the absence of statute compelling mixture of the
races at professional levels, it is submitted that the Regents
are entirely within their rights in cleaving fast to Maryland's
traditional policy of separation.
Thurgood Marshall for Appellee: What is at
stake here is more than the rights of my client. It is the
moral commitment stated in our country's creed. The State
is under no compulsion to establish a state university. Yet
if a state university is established, the rights of white and
black are measured by the test of equality in privileges
and opportunities. No arbitrary right to exclude qualified
students from the University of Maryland is claimed by
appellants except as to qualified Negroes, whom the
administrative authority would reject on the sole ground
of race or color.
While the Board of Regents of the University of
Maryland has large and discretionary powers in regard to
the management and control of the University, it has no
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power to make class distinctions or practice racial
discrimination. The reason is obvious. A discrimination
by the Board ofRegents against Negroes today may well
spread to a discrimination against Jews on the morrow;
Catholics on the day following; red headed men the day
after that.
The dual and inferior standard which appellants apply
to Negro education is evidenced by the pitiful attempt of
the President of the University on the witness stand to
assert that just as good a course was offered at Princess
Anne as at College Park. May it please the Court, a
college of technology for Negroes does not compare
equably with a college oflaw for white students, whatever
the cost. It is the essence of the idea of "equality" in this
case that the facilities be the same. There is no school of
law for Negroes in the State of Maryland. Further it does
not sound well for the agents ofthe State to complain that
there is no great demand on the part of Negroes for
collegiate and professional education, when the State itself
has made it difficult for Maryland Negroes to qualify for
collegiate and professional education because of the
inferior elementary schools which the State and counties
maintain and the absence ofadequate high school facilities
for Negroes.
The State's scholarship program is a specious gesture
to delude the Negto population of Maryland and keep it
quiet. The scholarship is but a tempting mess of pottage
held out to induce my client to sell his citizenship rights to
the same treatment which other citizens of Maryland
receive, no more and no less. Equivalents must also be
considered in terms of self-respect. Appellee is a citizen
ready to pay the same rate of taxes as any other citizen,
and to go as far as any other citizen in discharge of the
duties ofcitizenship to state and nation. He does not want
the scholarship or any other special treatment.
We do not concede that it is constitutional for a State
to export its obligations and to exile one set ofits citizens
beyond its borders to obtain the same education which it
is offering to citizens of different color at home. It is not
without significance that all the "free scholarships" which
the State provides for its white citizens are in Maryland
colleges and universities. Only its Negro citizens are exiled.
Finally, Mr. Murray is an individual. His years and
days are numbered, and he cannot wait for his education
until there is a mass demand to the satisfaction of the
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Regents. A citizen's constitutional rights receive protection
on an individual basis.

•••••••••••••••••••••••••
Narrator: On January 15, 1936, Martin Luther
King's seventh birthday, a unanimous court of appeals
affmned, agreeing that Murray had to be admitted to the
University of Maryland Law School. 76 The building of a
second school was not deemed an available alternative
remedy.77 Chief Judge Bond wrote that "[c]ompliance
with the Constitution cannot be deferred at the will ofthe
State. Whatever system it adopts for legal education now
must furnish equality oftreatment now.' '78
We all know what happened to Marshall. In Brown
v. Board of Education, 79 he successfully attacked as
unconstitutional the separate but equal doctrine he relied
on in Murray, as the Supreme Court opened the doors of
segregated public schools throughout the country. Then,
as Solicitor General and later as Justice of the Supreme
Court, Marshall continued his lifelong dedication to the
preservation of civil rights. One biographer of Marshall
has said that he was actually hoping for a loss in Murray,
so that the issue might be taken to the Supreme Court for
a ruling of greater impact.80 However, upon his retirement
from the Court in 1991, Marshall admitted that his 1936
victory was "sweet revenge. "81
After losing to Marshall, Assistant Attorney LeViness
was quoted as saying that he hoped that Murray would
"lead[] the class in law school. "82 Like his classmates,
Louis Goldstein and Fred Malkus, Murray did not fInish
first in his class. But he graduated, became a respected
member ofthe bar, practiced in Baltimore, and continued

to devote his energies to NAACP civil rights work. His
statue can be found in Lawyer's Mall in Annapolis, not far
from that of Marshall ' s, on the very spot where the court
of appeals building once stood.

•••••••••••••••••••••••••
It is 28 years later, and once again, much has changed

both with respect to the court of appeals and the judicial
system. A 1944 constitutional amendment reduced the
size of the court to five judges, but more importantly
confirmed the court's key executive and legislative roles
in the administration ofthe state judicial system. 83 By the
1960's, the Supreme Court's criminal justice revolution
foreshadowed the need for an intermediate appellate court
to handle the suddenly heavy workload of criminal cases.
However, Maryland was to create its own mini-criminal
justice revolution stemming from a routine murder case
tried in the Circuit Court for Cecil County in the late summer
of1964.
Lidge Schowgurow, a Buddhist who disavowed a
belief in God, was accused of murdering his wife. 84 He
was indicted by a grand j ury and convicted by a petit jury
required by Article 36 of the Maryland Declaration of
Rights to believe in the existence of God. 85 Challenging
his conviction of first degree murder as a violation of the
First and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States
Constitution, Schowgurow appealed to the court of
appeals. 86 He was represented by J. Grahame Walker;
the State, by Assistant Attorney General Roger D.
Redden. 87
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•••••••••••••••••••••••••
SCHOWGUROWv. STATFY8

J. Grahame Walker for Appellant: Mr.
Schowgurow was raised in the Buddhist faith. In an
affidavit duly filed, he stated that the Buddhist religion to
which he adheres does not teach a belief in the existence
of God or a Supreme Being. He challenged the
compositions ofthe grand jury which indicted him and the
petit jury which tried and convicted him because Article
36 ofthe Declaration of Rights requires jurors to express
a belief in God and that requirement deprives him of due
process and equal protection ofthe law.
Four years ago, in Torcaso v. Watkins, the Supreme
Court told the State ofMaryland that it's requirement that
public officers believe in God invaded their freedom of
religion. What is unconstitutional for an officer is no less
offensive for jurors.
The jurors in this case were sworn in accordance
with the requirements ofArticle 36 and obliged to profess
their belief in God. It is common knowledge that
substantial minorities do not profess to believe in God and
it is presumed that such persons exist among the citizens
of Maryland and the residents of Cecil County.
We do not need to know how many Buddhists live
in Cecil County or whether they were deliberately excluded
from the grand and petit juries. No proofofdiscrimination
is needed where the State Constitution requires the
exercise of discrimination. Article 36, by its very terms,
sets apart and discriminates against a segment of citizens
who do not believe in the existence of God. It clearly
prohibits an accused, whether a believer or a non-believer,
from being tried by a jury composed ofpersons who do
not believe in God, as well as persons professing a belief
in God. Its application can easily result in prejudice to an
accused when his lack of belief is manifested to the jury
by his failure to take the oath before testifying.
The First Amendment proscribes the use ofessentially
religious means to serve governmental ends. The trial,
conviction and punishment of an offender is solely a
government function for the protection of society. Its

SS

240 Md. 121,213 A.2d 475 (1965).

30.1 U. BaIt L.F. 24

secular character is obvious, but is perhaps best illustrated
by the imposition of a death sentence, which would be
hard to justify under any known religion. Ifthe doctrine of
separation of church and state is to mean anything, this
Court should find that Article 36 has violated Appellant's
constitutional rights and his conviction must be set aside.
Assistant Attorney General Roger D. Redden
for Appellant: Due process oflaw is an oracular concept,
which eludes expository definition. Even the prodigious
intellect of Justice Frankfurter found the task staggering.
But, however complex the problem ofdefinition, one finds
solace, and at least visceral comprehension, in resort to
due process's equivalent and basic measure - fairness.
The question before this court is one offairness alone,
and in that portion ofthe criminal process which is devoted
to the selection ofjurymen, fairness requires only that the
jury be indiscriminately drawn from among those eligible
in the community for jury service, untrammeled by any
arbitrary and systematic exclusions.
The Appellant, a Buddhist, asserts that his coreligionists have beenapriori excluded from Cecil County
jury service because (1) they do not believe in the existence
of God and (2) nonbelievers are excluded from Cecil
County jury service on account of Article 36 of the
Maryland Declaration of Rights.
Here is the center of dispute. Mr. Schowgurow has
proved nothing beyond his own allegiance to the Buddhist
faith. He has not even tried to prove anything else. There
is nothing in the record to show that there has ever been a
single adherent ofBuddhism resident in Cecil County who,
aside from the belief-in-God issue, was otherwise qualified
to serve as a juror, let alone that any Buddhist was excluded
from the call or, being called, was excluded from the panel
for failure to affirm his belief in the existence in God.
The only pertinent evidence of any kind is the
uniform declaration ofthe oaths administered by the Clerk
ofthe Circuit Court for Cecil County: "In the presence of
Almighty God, you ... do solemnly promise and declare
that ...." This declaration is no filter through which
nonbelievers cannot pass. Appellant negotiated it himself
without difficulty when he testified during his trial, a fact
which exposes the desperate emptiness of his present
claim, something conjured up from a series ofunfounded
assumptions.
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As to the Torcaso decision, it helps not hurts the
State's position. First, to the extent that Maryland caselaw
may be construed to opine that the discovery of a single
nonbeliever on a panel voids that panel's action, it was
overruled by Torcaso, which held that expression of a
belief in the existence of God could not be imposed as a
condition precedent to holding public office.
Second, Mr. Justice Black's identification of
Buddhism as an atheist religion in Torcaso does nothing
but confirm what the encyclopedists tell us. It does not
create any presumption as to the extent of Buddhist
practice in Maryland. It does not plant nor evangelize
Buddhism on the Eastern Shore. It does not oblige the
State's Attorney for Cecil County to canvass the
countryside for naysaying witnesses to prove what is a
good deal closer to common knowledge than the tenets
of Buddhism - that resident adherents to Buddhism are
unknown to Cecil County.
The Appellant has not met minimal standards of
showing unfairness and his conviction should be affirmed.

•••••••••••••••••••••••••
Narrator: The Schowgurow case was reargued
and the panel included specially assigned Circuit Court
Judge Shirley Jones, the first woman to sit on the Court of
Appeals (however briefly). The court, in October 1965,
announced its anguished but almost inevitable decision that
the belief in God requirement for grand and petit jurors
was unconstitutional. 89 Rejecting the State's and a dissent's
contention that no prejudice had been shown, the majority
held that an actual showing of discrimination was not
necessary when the exclusion of nonbelievers was "not '
only authorized but demanded by the Maryland
Constitution. "90 In a seeming victory for the State, the
court held that its decision did not apply retroactively
"except for convictions which have not become final. "91
But later decisions made it clear that a defendant could
not implicitly waive this issue ifhis or her conviction was

not final before Schowgurow. 92 According to the Attorney
General, this meant that two or three thousand defendants
had to be reindicted. 93
Not only did Schowgurow move the criminal justice
system into overdrive, but when some defendants on retrial
received a higher sentence, double jeopardy claims were
pressed. These Maryland cases eventually reached the
Supreme Court and convinced the Justices for the first
time to apply the Double Jeopardy Clause ofthe Fifth
Amendment to the states.94 As to Lidge Schowgurow,
after his retrial resulted in a hung jury and a mistrial, he
pled guilty in exchange for an 18-year sentence.95

•••••••••••••••••••••••••
Our last argument occurred some 28 years ago and,
although the Court appeared to change very little since
1965, the world had changed immeasurably. The typical
woman was no longer a "June Cleaver." She had entered
the workforce, the marketplace, and the practice oflaw.
She was no longer imprisoned by stereotypes or quietly
willing to accept discrimination. Mary Emily Stuart was
such a woman.
Married to Samuel Austell, Ms. Stuart continued
after her marriage to use her birth name. 96 But when she
tried to register to vote with the local election board, she
was told that under state law she had to register as Mrs.
Austell. 97 Stuart promptly filed suit in the Circuit Court
for Howard County, mising both statutory and constitutional
claims to the apparent state bar to the use of her real
name.98 Denied relief, she appealed to the court ofappeals
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and was joined by a number of Friends of the Court,
including the ACLU represented by Ruth Bader Ginsburg.99
Stuart was represented by Arold Ripperger; the State
Election Board by E. Stephen Derby. 100

•••••••••••••••••••••••••
STUART v. BOARD OF SUPERVISORSlol

Arold Ripperger for Appellant: Mary Emily
Stuart testified below that her marriage to Samuel Austell
was "based on the idea that we're both equal individuals
and our names symbolize that." Indeed, she said she would
not have gotten married ifit would have jeopardized her
name. Her name is on charge accounts, her driver's license
and social security registration. Everyone, she testified,
knows her by the name Mary Stuart.
Neither Maryland common law nor its election laws
force her to deny the truth and register to vote in her
husband's name. The common law rule is that a person
may adopt any name he or she wishes in the absence of
fraud or deceit.
As it was at common law, so now is it the option of
a married woman to choose the name that she desires to
use. Nellie Marie Marshall retained the name of her first
husband at the time of her second marriage. Amy
Vanderbilt, who has been married four times, said, "I have
always used my maiden name." Lynn Fontanne, of the
fabled Lunt and Fontanne acting team, adopted a
hyphenated name, Fontanne-Lunt, as her legal name. Lucy
Stone looked upon the loss of a woman's name at marriage
as a symbol of a loss of her individuality and consulted
several eminent lawyers, including Salmon P. Chase, later
Chief Justice of the United States, and was assured that
there was no law requiring the wife to take her husband's
name, only a custom. She remained Lucy Stone.
It is true that § 3-18 of the Election Code requires
clerks of court to notify election boards of the "present
names" of women over the age of 18 after being advised

99

See id. at 441,295 A.2d at 223.

11K.

See id. at 441, 295 A.2d at 223-24.

1111266 Md. 440, 295 A.2d 223 (1972).

30.1 U. BaIt L.F. 26

ofa "change ofname by marriage." However, that statute
does not apply in this case. Mary Stuart did not change
her name by marriage. There was no duty to advise the
clerk, no duty on the part ofthe clerk to advise the election
board, and no duty or authority of the election board to
question the name under which Mary Stuart sought to
register to vote.
If Maryland's law required a false registration by
Mary Stuart, it would be unconstitutional. As the Amicus
ACLU has argued, sex like race and alienage is an
immutable trait, a status into which class members are
locked by the accident of birth. The requirement that a
married woman assume her husband's name to register to
vote is not reasonable, but places her in equal status with
infants, lunatics and convicted felons. By whatever name
the Board of Elections calls its practice - administrative
convenience, necessary procedure, mandatory
requirement, it is discrimination and discrimination based
solely on sex. In its simplest terms, a married woman is
denied the statutory right to contract with her husband or
she is denied her constitutional right to vote.
Assistant Attorney General E. Stephen Derby
for Appellees: Today it is almost a universal rule in this
country that upon marriage, as a matter oflaw, a wife's
surname becomes that of her husband. While a wife may
continue to use her maiden name for professional and other
purposes, her name as a matter of public record is that of
her husband.
The provisions of § 3-18 on their face are premised
upon an assumption by the legislature that a woman's name
does change when she marries, in accordance with the
common law rule. Any other conclusion would deprive
the provisions of meaning because the only information
possessed by the clerk of court is the fact ofthe marriage.
The administrative application ofthe statute to require every
woman voter who has married to change her name on the
registration books gives the section meaning. If a married
woman could elect whether to adopt her married name
for voting, then the purpose of the statute in furthering the
State's interests in preventing voter fraud, in providing an
accurate trail ofidentification, and in uniform record keeping
would not be served.
The State Elections Administrator testified that there
are approximately 1,762,000 registered voters in
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Maryland. Assuming one half are female and the majority
of them are or will be at some time married, it will be
necessary to have a trail to identify persons and to prevent
voter fraud. If a married woman could register under
different names, the identification trail would be lost. As a
practical matter, the election boards ofthe State are not in
a position to make complicated factual determinations as
to whether a married woman voter is not and has never
been known by her married surname. Therefore, it is
reasonable for the boards, to insist always upon use ofthe
surname adopted by marriage unless a married woman
has taken the relatively easy step of changing her name
legally for all purposes by a court order.
There is simply no constitutional issue in this case
involving a denial of the right to vote because appellant
has not been denied that right. It is completely within her
power and discretion to register to vote. She is required
to do so in her legal name, whether by common law or
custom, but no burden is imposed upon her which
impinges upon her right to vote.
To the extent that the court may find that a
discrimination does exist, it is one based on sex and
marriage because ofthe automatic consequent that, absent
a legal change of name, a woman's surname becomes that
ofher husband uponrnarriage. Ifit exists, the discrimination
is one caused by the uniform common law rule or custom,
applicable to married women, and it is not one involving
the elective franchise. The right involved is the right to
assume any name a person wishes. However, the right to
assume a name ofone's choice does not have constitutional
status. Rather it is based on common law. Furthermore,
the Supreme Court has yet to hold that discriminations
based on sex are inherently suspect.
Whatever inconvenience the State rule may cause
Appellant is slight when weighed against the interests of
the State in uniform recordkeeping, in accurate
identification ofvoters, and in preventing voter fraud .

name and to use it nonfraudulently after her marriage. 102
The majority, over one dissent, also found that state election
laws did not forbid such use because Stuart did not undergo
a "change in name by marriage. "103
The very next day, the judges dedicated a new
courthouse on Rowe Boulevard - the court's present
10cation. 104 At the same time, the court adopted distinctive
new judicial garb - actually a return to the dress worn by
members immediately after the Revolutioruuy War: scarlet
rather than black robes and a stock with tabs. lOS More
than location and robes would change, as within a few
short years, the court would have its first woman and
African-American members. Now more than 223 years
old, the Court of Appeals of Maryland remains a
progressive and respected institution, with much ofits
glorious history remaining to unfold.
Visit the Maryland Archives website at
mdarchives.state.md.us for more infonnation on this article
and the State of Maryland in general.

•••••••••••••••••••••••••
Narrator: A month before state voters approved
an Equal Rights Amendment, and on October 9, 1972, in
his first opinion of his 24-year career on the court, Chief
Judge Robert C. Murphy, concluded that Maryland
common law permits a Maryland woman to retain her birth
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